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Predicting the Truth: Overcoming
Problems with Poppers Verisimilitude
Through Model Selection Theory
K Raleigh Hanson, Washington State University
Abstract
The purpose of this research is to investigate the possibility of using aspects of model selection
theory to overcome both a logical problem and an epistemic problem that prevents progress
towards the truth being measured while maintaining a realist approach to science. Karl Popper
began such an investigation into the problem of progress in 1963 with the idea of
verisimilitude, but his attempts failed to meet his own criteria, the logical and epistemic
problems, for a metric of progress. Although philosophers have attempted to fix Popper’s
verisimilitude, none have seemed to overcome both criteria yet. My research analyzes the
similarities between Predictive Accuracy (PA) and Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC), both
parts of model selection theory, and Popper’s criteria for progress. I find that, in ideal data
situations, it seems that PA and AIC satisfy both criteria; however, in non-ideal data situations,
there are issues that appear. These issues present an interesting dilemma for scientific progress
if it turns out that our theories are in non-ideal data situations, yet PA and AIC seem to be
better overall indicators of scientific progress towards the truth than other attempts at
overcoming the problems of Popper’s verisimilitude.

Predicting the Truth: Overcoming Problems with Popper’s
Verisimilitude Through Model Selection Criteria
One problem when discussing scientific progress is whether or not our current theories
have made any progress towards the truth, or have just become better predictive tools. There
is an intuitive notion that newer theories are truer than older theories because they appear to
identify more true causes of a target system. However, it turns out that it is notoriously difficult
to provide an analysis of what it means for one theory to be closer to the truth than another
theory. The issue is even more pronounced when considering the pessimistic meta-induction:
since all of our past theories have been false, it is likely that all of our current theories will also
be false and our future theories as well. This poses a problem for scientific realism which holds
that identifying the true causes of a target system is an important aim of science.
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While the discovery of new causes that affect target systems does seem to be an
important part of scientific progress, it is not clear that increasing the ability to predict the
behavior of target systems will always correspond to knowing more causes of that system
(Forster and Sober 1994). In fact there is some evidence that our best predictive models and
theories might not always be our best explanatory models and theories (Goldsby 2013).
However, if we want to define progress in realist terms, there needs to be some account of
what proximity to the truth is and how newer theories get us closer to the truth. I will refer to
these two concerns as the logical problem and the epistemic problem respectively.
An early attempt to overcome the logical and epistemic problems was introduced by
Karl Popper in his work Conjectures and Refutations. Popper (1963) called his attempt to
overcome the two problems verisimilitude. The concept behind verisimilitude is intuitive in
nature – a theory is closer to the truth if it makes more true claims and fewer false claims – but
his later commentators would point out critical flaws such that verisimilitude was found to be
inadequate for solving either the logical or the epistemic problem. A number of attempts have
been made to revise or fix Popper’s language to make verisimilitude work, but none have
overcome both the logical and epistemic problems. However, if progress can be defined as
overcoming the logical and epistemic problems, then it is possible there may exist a framework
elsewhere that satisfies that criteria.
One possible framework, predictive accuracy (PA), is a measure of the ability of a model
to predict new data given old data. One plausible assumption is that the true model will be
maximally predictively accurate, so increasing predictive accuracy will get one closer to the
truth. According to Forster and Sober (1994), PA may be estimated using Akaike’s Information
Criterion (AIC). If PA can be a measure of closeness to the truth, then using a model selection
framework like AIC can select models closer to the truth. If, in turn, AIC can select a model that
is closer to the truth because it is more predictively accurate than competing models, AIC can
be useful for estimating progress. In this way, PA overcomes the logical problem by being a
measure of how one model can be closer to the truth than another, and AIC overcomes the
epistemic problem by showing that, when a new model is selected, it is because of both its
increased proximity to the truth as well as its ability to predict new data.
The main concern for this paper is to investigate whether PA and AIC actually can
overcome the logical and epistemic problems. I will begin by explaining why a notion of
verisimilitude is important for the progress of science. I will then provide some background to
Popper’s account of verisimilitude, and I will introduce model selection theory and explain how
PA and AIC appear to satisfy the criteria demanded by verisimilitude. I will argue that PA and
AIC can overcome both problems while in an ideal data situation and discuss what may occur
while in non-idea data situations. Finally, I will address the problems of PA and AIC as a form of
verisimilitude and discuss what sort of progress we may actually have made.

Why is Progress Towards the Truth Important?
There are two basic accounts of the goals of scientific inquiry: realism and
instrumentalism. Scientific realism maintains a concern for understanding the truth behind
phenomena including things that can’t be directly observed. Even if the pessimistic induction is
right, realism holds that newer theories can be closer to the truth than older theories. For
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example, it seems correct to say that even though Copernicus’s heliocentric model of the solar
system is false, it is still closer to the truth than Ptolemy’s geocentric model.
Unlike realists, instrumentalists view scientific theories as tools that help capture or
predict observable phenomena regardless of the truth-value of the theories themselves
(Chakravartty 2014). In this way, an instrumentalist values theories that can predict or account
for observable phenomena even if we can’t know the truth about the unobservable
commitments of that theory (Van Fraassen 1980). Instrumentalists believe that the truth of
unobservables is inaccessible and science should be aimed at predicting observable phenomena
rather than identifying all and only true causes.
Although Popper was a realist, his critics would point out that his hypothetico-deductive
approach38 to science by falsifying theories only winnows away at an infinite set of false
theories and this does not constitute actual progress. Popper’s (1963) verisimilitude was his
attempt to show that false theories could have degrees of closeness to the truth, and that
removing false theories does constitute progress towards the truth. Popper hoped that
verisimilitude would allow him to be a realist while still holding to his hypothetico-deductive
approach to scientific inquiry. If progress towards the truth is the goal of science as Popper
claims, then discarding an instrumentalist approach is an important step.

Popper’s Verisimilitude
Popper correctly identified the logical and epistemic problems that must be overcome
for verisimilitude to provide a measure of progress. The aims of verisimilitude can be easily
formulated as the following questions:
(A) Can we explain how one theory can be closer to the truth, or has greater
verisimilitude than another?
(B) Can we show that scientific practice has sometimes led to theories which are closer
to the truth than their predecessors? (Forster; ms) 39
The first question addresses the logical problem: we must have an account of how one theory is
closer to the truth than another. The second question addresses the epistemic problem. Given
our epistemic limitations, we must be able to determine that the selection of one theory over
another is actually progress towards the truth.
Of course, Popper had to clarify how the degrees of truth would be measured. Popper's
(1963) intuitive definition of verisimilitude, Vs, of theory A is based upon a measure of the true
and false contents of A. The Ct(A) is made of all of the logical consequences of A and can be
divided into truth content, CtT(A), and false content, CtF(A). Truth content of A is the set of all
claims that are true in Ct(A), and false content is the set of all claims that are false in Ct(A).
CtF(A), subtracted from CtT(A) provides a measure of verisimilitude:
38

Popper’s (1959) hypothetico-deductive approach was presented in his Logic of Scientific Discovery. According to
Popper’s method, a hypothesis should be formed in a way that can be deductively falsified rather than supported
by evidence.
39
Forster credits an unpublished manuscript by Alan Musgrave for this formulation of the logical and epistemic
problems.
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Vs(A)= CtT(A)-CtF(A) (Popper 1963, 234)
This intuitive definition provides the basic notion behind verisimilitude within a single theory by
determining the number of true and false logical consequences of theory A. The intuitive notion
behind this measure is simple; it provides a measure Vs(A) based upon CtT(A) and CtF(A). By
quantifying the true and false content of theories, this definition would allow two theories, A
and B, to be compared as follows:
𝑉𝑠 𝐴 > 𝑉𝑠 𝐵 ↔ 𝐶𝑡! 𝐴 − 𝐶𝑡! 𝐴

> [𝐶𝑡! 𝐵 − 𝐶𝑡! 𝐵 ]

The intuitive definition is a good first pass at the logical problem, but real theories are more
complicated. For example, assume there are two theories, A and B, and that theory A and
theory B are both false. To explain this concept, Popper (1963) offers the following example for
any given theory: assume that today is Monday and theory A states that today is Tuesday;
although theory A is false, it still entails true logical content such as today is not Wednesday
and today is either Monday or Tuesday (Popper 1963). Because there are an infinite number of
consequences, the Popper’s first pass can’t actually serve as a measure of verisimilitude.
Popper improved upon his first pass by using set-theoretic terms to create a contrastive
definition of verisimilitude. Popper’s (1963) contrastive verisimilitude (PCV) can be stated as
follows:
(PCV)

𝑉𝑠 𝐴 < 𝑉𝑠 𝐵 ↔ 𝐶𝑡! 𝐴 ⊂ 𝐶𝑡! 𝐵

∧ [𝐶𝑡! 𝐵 ⊆ 𝐶𝑡! 𝐴 ]

That is to say that for B to have greater verisimilitude, B must make every true claim made by A
and at least one additional true claim not made by A, and every false claim made by B must also
be made by A without any additional false claims.
As an example, consider Ptolemaic astronomy and Copernican astronomy. For the sake
of simplicity, suppose that the only difference in content between Ptolemaic astronomy and
Copernican astronomy is the location of the sun and the Earth. Copernican astronomy makes
one true claim not made by Ptolemaic astronomy, the Earth revolves around the sun. Ptolemaic
astronomy makes one false claim not made by Copernican astronomy, the sun revolves around
the Earth. If PCV holds, Copernican astronomy has greater verisimilitude because it makes all
the true claims that Ptolemaic astronomy makes plus an additional true claim, all the false
claims made by Ptolemaic astronomy are also made by Copernican astronomy, and Copernican
astronomy makes one fewer false claim. Popper had examples like this in mind when he
developed PCV to satisfy the criteria for verisimilitude.

The Problem with Popper’s Verisimilitude
PCV, however, is also problematic in a similar manner to Popper’s intuitive definition.
Working independently, Pavel Tichý (1974) and David Miller (1974) both discovered a critical
logical flaw to PCV. Tichý and Miller both pointed out that two competing false theories will
never meet the subset relations PCV lays out because whenever a new true consequence is
added, a new false consequence is added as well. Consider the following claims:
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P1: The sun revolves around the earth
P2: The planets move in perfect circles
C3: The Earth revolves around the sun
Of course, we now know that P1 and P2 are false and C3 is true. The Ptolemaic model says P1
and P2 are true. The Copernican model says P2 and C3 are true. Now consider the following
claim:
C4: P2 and C3
C4 is false because any conjunction that contains one false conjunct is always false. It is also a
false claim that is not contained within the Ptolemaic theory. This can be called the conjunction
problem. A true claim made by theory B but not made by theory A can be conjoined with a false
claim made by theory B to create a new false claim not made by theory A. Thus, PCV will fail.
The incomparability of false theories is one of the consequences that developed from
analysis of Popper's theory of verisimilitude. Tichý’s and Miller’s treatments of Popper's work
show that it is impossible to add true consequences to a theory without also adding false ones,
and equally impossible to subtract false consequences without also subtracting true ones. Two
theories cannot be compared in terms of scientific progress towards the truth as Popper has
defined it either as an intuitive notion or through PCV.

Applying Model Selection as Verisimilitude
If the concern of verisimilitude is to produce results that show theory progression is
moving towards the truth by overcoming the logical and epistemic problems, it may be possible
to look to forms of model selection that could serve the same purpose. A model is simply a set
of equations that contain a number of adjustable parameters that is used to explain or predict a
phenomenon (Forster 2000). A model can be broken down into the following parts:
parameters, variables, and error terms. Consider the following toy models:
𝑀1
𝑀2
𝐹𝐼𝑇

𝑦 = 𝑎𝑥! + 𝑒
𝑦 = 𝑎𝑥! + 𝑏𝑥! + 𝑒
𝑦 = 7𝑥! + 0

In the above models, y is the dependent variable, x1 and x2 are independent variables, a, and b
are adjustable parameters, and e is an error term to correct for observational errors. FIT is a
fitted model where all the parameters are fixed. M1 and M2 represent families of curves or
fitted models. For example, M1 represents all the curves that could occur when values are
applied to the parameters. Note that FIT is a member of the family of fitted models of M1 (and
M2).40 The dependent variable is the measurable quantity of interest, and the independent
variables are the causes that influence that quantity.
Model selection is concerned with fitting models to data, a process called curve fitting.
Consider a graph of collected data. From a realist perspective, it is assumed that there is a true
40

All of the fitted models of M1 are within the family of M2 where b equals 0.
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curve that generates the data (give or take observational error). The goal of model selection is
to find a model that is as close to the true curve as possible given the available data. Practicing
scientists know that when the data set is small, simpler models tend to be better predictors
than more complex models. In fact, it is well known that curves that perfectly go through every
data point tend to be poor predictors because they overfit the data. The problem with
overfitting is that it mistakes observational error for a true cause of the target system. If the
goal of scientific realism is to discover true causes, and model selection can be used to identify
true causes of a target system by avoiding overfitting and increasing PA, it may be possible to
use model selection criteria to overcome the problems of verisimilitude.

Predictive Accuracy and AIC
Predictive accuracy, as defined by Forster and Sober (1994), is the ability for a selected
model to predict new data given existing data. In situations where there is little data available,
a simple model may be more predictively accurate than a more complex one, but as more data
becomes available, the choice of models may be revised because the simpler model fails to be
as predictively accurate. For example, in data poor situations, a simple model like M1 may be
more predictively accurate, but, as the amount of data increases, a more complex model like
M2 may be selected because of its greater ability to predict new data.
Although there are many types of model selection theories, this paper is concerned with
AIC due to its relation to verisimilitude. Forster (2000) explains that an important part of AIC is
that “the conclusions of AIC are . . . about its closeness to the truth” (213). If the true curve is
maximally predictively accurate, and if AIC chooses the maximally predictively accurate curve
given the data available, increasing PA can overcome the logical problem and AIC should
overcome the epistemic problem.
The purpose of AIC is to minimize the Kullbach-Leibler distance41 (K-L) between
potential fitted curves within a family and the true curve represented by the data (Forster
2000). K-L distance, as defined by Burnham and Anderson (2002), indicates the distance
between a candidate model and the true curve. However, since K-L distance cannot be
computed without a prior knowledge of the true curve, a selection criterion like AIC must be
used (Burnam and Anderson 2002). AIC, then, is supposed to provide an estimation of the
closeness to the truth of a model. Sober (2008) provides the following formulation of AIC:
𝐴𝐼𝐶(𝑀) =!" 𝐿𝑜𝑔 Pr 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝐿 𝑀

−𝑘

In this formulation, L(M) represents the likeliest fitted model of M given the data available.
AIC(M) is found by taking the log likelihood of L(M) and subtracting a penalty for complexity, k.
The term k represents the number of parameters in the model and is used to prevent AIC from
overfitting a model given the data when models are being compared. Complex models always
fit the data better than simpler models, but as noted earlier, complex models are not always
better predictors due to problems of overfitting. By having the correction for complexity, AIC is
41

It is worth noting that the K-L distance is not a true distance because it does not satisfy the triangle inequality.
However, for the purposes of this paper the term “distance” works to clearly relate the concept of closeness or
proximity between curves.
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able to provide a reliable estimate of the model’s PA. Thus, AIC only selects a model with a
greater number of parameters when the log likelihood overcomes the k penalty.
Because AIC scores are dependent on the size of the data set, as the amount of data
increases, AIC could select more complex models. For example, assume that there are three
candidate models:
𝑀1
𝑀2
𝑀3

𝑦 = 𝑎𝑥! + 𝑒
𝑦 = 𝑎𝑥! + 𝑏𝑥! + 𝑒
𝑦 = 𝑎𝑥! + 𝑏𝑥! + 𝑐𝑥! + 𝑒

In a data poor situation, AIC might favor the simpler model such that the following inequality
holds: AIC(M1)>AIC(M2)>AIC(M3). As we gather more evidence and the size of the data set
increases, the AIC might recommend M2 over M1 if the AIC score of M2 is greater than M1. If it
is true that x2 is a new cause affecting the system, then it may seem that increasing PA will
likewise increase closeness to the truth. In this way, the use of PA and AIC makes great progress
dealing with both the logical and epistemic problems. Forster and Sober (1994) indicate that
minimizing K-L distance to the true curve is the same as maximizing predictive accuracy. When
selecting a model with the best AIC score, the model being selected is the closest model to the
true curve given the available data.
The contrastive nature of PA and AIC also seem to overcome the epistemic problem that
PCV failed to do. As new data is gathered, AIC may select a different family of curves with
greater predictive accuracy than the current model. Because there is an existing metric of truth
with the AIC score, obtaining a better score and increasing PA provides a contrastive view of
progress similar to what Popper had attempted to do with PCV. In the examples of M1, M2, and
M3 above, when AIC selects M2 over M1, an increase in closeness to the truth is being made
along with an increase in predictive accuracy. That is, the new model is capturing more true
causes of the target system while increasing the ability to accurately predict new data.

When AIC Fails
However, the ability for PA and AIC to overcome the logical and epistemic problems is
based on ideal data situation. In data poor or data rich situations, there are complications that
arise and create interesting dilemmas. Assume, for example, there is a target system that has
three causes previously identified; however, the size of the data set is small. Even though we
may know there are three causes of the target system, AIC may select a simpler model with
only one cause because it will have greater predictive accuracy instead of a model that includes
all three causes and is closer to the truth. This wrinkle may seem minor, but it shows that AIC
may be tracking our ability to predict new data rather than tracking a theory’s closeness to the
truth in such a way that, while it can overcome the logical problem, it only does so in ideal data
situations. However, the epistemic problem is still answered since, as data increases, AIC selects
models that do identify more true causes of the target system as the predictive accuracy
increases for those models.
Before turning to the next dilemma, the e term for observational error must be
discussed. All of our scientific inquiry is subject to observational error or noise that is included
in a data set. AIC assumes that observational error is present and accounts for it, but the very
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presence of observational error is what leads to a greater problem behind AIC. There is a
possibility that AIC will fail in data rich situations by selecting models that are further from the
truth. While the error term included in models is supposed to deal with observational errors, as
data sets get larger, there is a chance that AIC will recommend an additional parameter that is
not a cause of the system being investigated. In other words, our model selection framework
might be tracking the cause of observational error and mistakenly attributing it as a cause of
the system under investigation. Forster and Sober (1994) explain that AIC was designed to
estimate the size of the overfitting factor, but they also mention that the process is fallible.
Given the possibility for AIC to recommend an error term as a new cause, we are now left with
an interesting dilemma wherein either the logical problem or the epistemic problem will
reassert itself. I will consider each horn of the dilemma separately.
I will begin by addressing the first horn. If our goal is to discover all the true causes
affecting the target system, then in data rich situations we cannot be sure that a newly
discovered variable is representing a cause of the target system or a cause of our observational
error. If AIC is identifying causes of something outside of the target system, then there are
some cases where we cannot tell whether progress is being made even if we are increasing
predictive accuracy.
To illustrate the second horn of the dilemma, we can consider how a defender of the
model selection framework might reply to the first horn. One might maintain that increasing PA
always gets us closer to some truth. However, the truth being identified by increasing PA ceases
to be about the target system, but begins to track the truth about the system that generates
the data. This new system would take account of both the target system and the causes of our
observational error. In such a situation, we give up the noumena in favor of the phenomena –
we exchange our realist notion of the truth of a target system for the appearance created by
the data. It is hard to see how such a solution would be palatable to scientific realists. Since the
logical problem was supposed to allow for scientific realism, it seems that such a step gives up
on the logical problem altogether.
These two horns of AIC create a trade off when dealing with the logical and epistemic
problems. Either we accept that our choice in models can select better theories but we cannot
always tell if we are getting closer to the truth, or we give up on scientific realism in favor of the
notion that models with greater PA are closer to the truth about the system that gives rise to
the data but not the true target of our inquiry.

Conclusion
PA and AIC seem to be heading in the right direction in understanding progress.
However, if providing answers to Popper’s logical and epistemic questions are the criteria by
which a true sense of progress can be determined, PA and AIC seem to fall short of the mark if
we want to maintain a realist approach to progress in all cases. The problem of data poor
situations can be overcome by increasing the size of the data pool, and progress towards the
truth can still be made. However, in data rich situations that may not be the case. Although AIC
runs into this problem at the extreme limit, and it’s likely that our extant theories have yet to
run into it, there is a possibility that AIC will stop modeling the true causes of the target system
at some point, and increasing PA will no longer be progress towards the truth of the target
system. Of course, increasing PA and selecting a model with the best AIC, in ideal data
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situations, does seem to satisfy both the logical and epistemic problem, so it may give progress
hope. In terms of theories that can capture closeness to the truth and the movement of
progress, PA and AIC seem to come closer than Popper’s first attempt. Reminiscent of Popper’s
hypothetico-deductive method, PA and AIC seem to hold up to more severe tests than Popper’s
theory of verisimilitude did, and, in some ways, that seems like it is progress in itself.
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